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Abstract—Additive manufacturing cyber-physical system is
vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Statistical methods
can estimate the probability of breaching security but hackathons
have revealed that skilled humans can launch very innovative
attacks not anticipated before. Here, we summarize lessons
learned from the past two offerings of HACK3D hackathon.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital manufacturing methods, such as additive manu-
facturing (AM), are fueling the next industrial revolution.
It is estimated that over 600,000 desktop 3D printers were
sold in 2019 and the cumulative annual growth rate of this
sector is 25% over the past three years. AM is expected
to revolutionize the $13 trillion large-scale manufacturing by
bringing the manufacturer closer to the user, shortening the
supply chain and enabling customization of products at low
cost. AM has been adopted by medical [1], [2], automotive [3],
aerospace [4], and consumer goods industries that require
customized products in small production runs. The benefits
of AM include the ability to manufacture parts with complex
internal structures and geometries that cannot be made with
traditional manufacturing methods.
AM security is gaining attention due to the involvement
of trusted, partially trusted, and untrusted parties in the AM
supply chain. This requires a taxonomy of analysis of threats
and vulnerabilities and developing security methods specific
to AM. For example, it is essential to assess the AM printers
used to protect the intellectual property (IP) of the designers
and to assure the quality of the raw materials.
AM attack vectors and impacts have been discussed from
a cyber-physical perspective in [5]. For example, they demon-
strate insertion of voids in the stereolithography (STL) files
that go undetected by traditional finite element analysis (FEA]
and mechanical testing. Similarly, a stealthy AM tool path
modification attack can go undetected [6]. These attacks
highlight the need for improved quality controls, cybersecurity
education, and development of AM security assessment. A
methodology for detecting attacks on an artifact’s intrinsic
behavior is presented in [7]. This adapts structural health mon-
itoring techniques by using antennas connected to piezoelectric
transducers to obtain the impedance signature of parts. This
approach is limited to attacks that alter this signature.
The AM process model has been studied and a new “fed-
erated” information systems architecture for AM has been
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developed in [8]. This architecture establishes specific require-
ments for end-to-end information sharing, quality control, and
performance assurance. [9] investigate IP protection for out-
sourced AM, and study an alternative model that incorporates
third party process tuning experts. The paper presents a risk
assessment focused on IP protection and provides recommen-
dation to minimize the risks of this model. Furthermore, [10]
surveys the significance of AM for national security. The
authors explain the benefits of AM for regenerative medicine,
especially in battlefield injuries, and highlight threats from
counterfeiting and IP theft.
Considering that critical applications in aerospace and
medicine are enabled by AM parts, security methods need
to be tested extensively to understand potential vulnerabilities.
This study reports the outcomes of a crowd sourcing approach
to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the security
methods developed for AM.
Paper roadmap. The paper is organized as follows: in Section
II we provide a brief overview of AM cyber-physical system
(CPS) and a taxonomy of cyber threats. Section III presents
HACK3D, a hackathon we organized to evaluate the strengths
of certain security methods by crowdsourcing. Our concluding
remarks are discussed in Section IV.
II. THE AM CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM
A. The AM process chain
Figure 1 shows the AM process chain that includes
computer-aided design (CAD), design refinement by simula-
tion tools such as finite element analysis (FEA), manufacturing
of the part on a 3D printer followed by testing and assem-
bly. The product design process remains the same even in
traditional manufacturing such as machining or milling. Due
to innovation in automation, an increasing number of man-
ufacturing methods are coming online. All steps involved in
AM are dependent on computers and cloud for collaboration,
machine control, and data acquisition and analysis. Hence, all
these steps are targets for cyber attacks.
B. Taxonomy of cyber threats faced by AM
The attacks involved in the AM supply chain are classified
in four categories as illustrated in Figure 2 [12]. Some of the
attacks such as counterfeit production and reverse engineering
require extensive computer and software support for 3D scan-
ning, CAD modeling and other steps, but they do not involve
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
04
36
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  9
 M
ay
 20
20
2Fig. 1. The additive manufacturing cyber-physical system. *Injection molding is an example non-AM manufacturing process that may use the same computer
controlled flow [11].
Fig. 2. Classification of attacks in AM supply chain [12].
interacting with the AM supply chain except for procuring
the part. Other threats such as direct sabotage by hacking 3D
printers require cybersecurity strategies such as network access
monitoring and control, firewall, and communication channel
encryption. As shown in Figure 3, the cybersecurity threats
present in the AM supply chain can be classified across five
orthogonal dimensions (what, when, how, why and effect) and
can cover various threat categories listed in Figure 2. Many
of the defects introduced in the AM may not be detected by
the commonly used characterization methods. Several security
methods are available that can be applied to AM supply chain
but strength of these methods for AM supply chain needs to
be analyzed. Table I presents analysis of some of the common
threats as well as their level of impact on a typical AM
supply chain. Not all attacks can cause the same degree of
harm; for example, an attack during the CAD phase may have
low success probability since measurements taken in several
subsequent steps can show the deviations. However, an attack
during the slicing step where only one operator is typically
involved may go undetected depending on the testing method.
Threat analysis needs to be conducted for specific products to
determine the appropriate security strategies.
III. HACK3D TO ASSESS STRENGTH OF AM SECURITY
A popular approach to assess the strength of security strate-
gies is to conduct a red-team-blue team challenge involving
participants from diverse backgrounds. Owing to the cyber-
physical nature of the AM process, the diversity of back-
grounds include materials science, mechanical engineering,
industrial engineering, and computer science. This study de-
signed challenges and invited red teams (especially students of
diverse education levels and backgrounds) to participate in the
HACK3D challenge. In the preliminary rounds of HACK3D
the red-team participants worked locally using locally avail-
able resources. The final round was held onsite at NYU
Center for Cybersecurity as part of the annual CSAW event
in early November[13]. The onsite participants had a fixed
amount of time to solve the HACK3D AM security challenges.
While challenges 1 and 3 described below were used in the
preliminary rounds, challenges 2 and 4 were given in the
onsite final rounds. A large number of red teams participated
in the preliminary rounds. However, we limit our study to
the approaches taken by the finalists who competed onsite in
solving the HACK3D challenges1.
The HACK3D challenges included recovering the design
of an object from digital files and information throughout the
AM supply chain. Each challenge investigates a pathway in
the threat taxonomy and studies the attacks2.
A. HACK3D Challenge 1
Challenge. The participants received a set of XYZ coordinates
in the 3D space describing the shape of a part (see Figure 4(a)).
The red-team participants use this information to recreate a 3D
1Interviews with participants helped form a full picture of the approaches.
2For example, to steal designs from limited information.
3Fig. 3. A taxonomy of security threats faced by AM.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. In HACK3D Challenge 1, the participants were asked to reconstruct
the 3D model in (a) given a set of XYZ coordinates that describes the design.
The coordinates can be visualized as a point cloud like (b).
model of the object. The XYZ coordinates can be visualized
as a point cloud shown in Figure 4(b).
Reported Attacks: The attackers needed to recreate a 3D
model based on the coordinates. One team used Microsoft
Excel to convert the coordinates to a point cloud format
and imported it into SolidWorks. They created a mesh using
GeoMagic Add-in and obtained reference curves from the
meshes. By combining the reference curves and the point cloud
outline, the red team recreated the 3D model.
Another red team leveraged FeatureScript tool in OnShape
[14]. FeatureScript allows users to generate 3D models using
JavaScript or C. The team developed scripts to automatically
extract information from the coordinates, draw poly-lines, and
delete unnecessary faces layer by layer. They used this way to
recreate 234 layers and assembled them to recreate the model
of the final design. Finally, a HACK3D red team of mechanical
engineers used the Scanto3D tool in SolidWorks to reconstruct
the 3D model of the design. This shows that a commercial
software can not only aid design, but also provide a fast track
for attackers to launch attacks.
B. HACK3D Challenge 2
Challenge. The participants received the STL files of two
designs (Figure 5(a)) and were required to identify correct
slicing and printing orientations that would remove all surface
and internal defects from the files. These two models were
designed to have security features such that if they are not
printed in a certain orientation, the prints will have either
internal or surface defects.
Attacks. Most teams made efforts to slice the models in dif-
ferent orientations to check whether defects or nicks survive.
Some participants created a table to enumerate all possible
rotations. There are three axes (X, Y, Z) and each of them can
rotate by 360 degrees, so in total it creates 3603 ≈ 4.7× 107
possible combinations (considering 1 degree rotation step).
Although the basic principles is to try all possible combina-
tions using brute force, different teams came up with smart
strategies to quickly narrow down the search space, so that
they can approach the correct solution within the tight time
constraint of 7 hours.
First, the challenge participants characterized design A as
a complex, open prism with several holes. The main flaws
were introduced due to the presence of segmentation in each
layer (Figure 5(b)), which decreases structural integrity of the
print. Therefore, the main goal is to find an orientation for
design A such that each layer shows a continuous toolpath.
Second, the surface area of the bottom layer is also taken into
consideration when the challenge participants were seeking
the correct orientation. The bottom layer needs larger area
and mass, so that it can lead to a higher quality of printing as
a larger bottom layer provides a much greater adhesion to the
base plate. After a few trials of different orientations, some of
the participants successfully found the correct orientation for
printing. The correct orientation is shown in Figure 5(d).
Design B is a solid box with defined dimensions. However,
inside the box, the rectangular prisms were embedded with
spade shaped flaws, giving the surface several nicks (Fig-
ure 5(c)). It is anticipated that the undesirable nicks would
decrease the overall integrity of the print. The participants
discovered that the nicks remain if they do not turn the printing
4TABLE I
ASSESSMENT OF AM RISKS. HIGH, MEDIUM, AND LOW RISK ARE REPRESENTED AS RED, YELLOW, AND GREEN CELLS.
Threat Scenario Vulnerability Description Impact Likelihood EstimatedRisk
IP theft from design and specification
files
Weak access controls and improper au-
thentication and authorization
Reverse engineering/reconstruction Lack of digital rights management
Ransomware attack No backups, weak controls to criticalcontent
Corruption of design files or material
databases
No backups, weak controls to critical
content
Malicious modification of dimensions
or shape of object
Inadequate tests, weak integrity con-
trols, lack of proper validation
Malicious reduction in the structural
integrity of the 3D artifact, introduction
of defects
Insufficient structural integrity tests, file
integrity controls, and post-production
testing
Irreversible damage to hardware and
mechanical elements of the 3D printer
Lack of hardware fail-safes, inadequate
input validation
Installation of firmware Trojan on 3D
printer
Weak authentication, authorization and
privilege management, insecure update
process
Corruption of calibration of the 3D
printer
Insufficient file integrity controls, weak
file access validation
Memory safety violation on 3D printer
firmware using malicious/out of spec
file inputs
Inadequate input sanitizing, weak con-
trol flow integrity checks
Evading post-production structural in-
tegrity tests
Limited granularity in test methods,
limited resolution of tests, inadequate
sample size
orientation, regardless of the choice of the bottom layer. By
fine tuning the rotation angle, they eventually found the correct
orientations for printing Design B without internal defects. The
current orientation is shown in Figure 5(e).
Although it seemed possible to create an algorithm that
can rotate the parts automatically on all axes and find the
orientation that would not have any holes in it, the presence
of some of the design features in the geometry made the
task more complicated. Also, the possibility that the best
orientation can be obtained at rotation by a fraction of a
degree, the actual cases that an algorithm would run is several
orders of magnitude larger than 107. This particular case
highlighted the benefit of conducting the hackathon for testing
the strength of the security features because participants could
rotate the designs on a few axes and visually eliminate a large
number of possibilities very quickly and focused on only a
few plausible solutions.
C. HACK3D Challenge 3
Challenge. The challenge red-teams mimic attackers who
steal a partially damaged G-code file, which only models the
bottom part of a chess piece, as opposed to a complete chess
piece. Figure 6(a) shows the damaged G-code as viewed in a
G-code viewer. The participants need to solve two problems:
(1) identify the correct piece among three candidates pieces
(Pawn, Bishop, and Queen) that the partial design represents
and (2) complete the piece. The challenge organizers provided
an orthographic image of all candidates in Figure 6(b), and a
text file with the true z-heights of each piece.
While it was possible, but difficult, to do measurements
of curvatures and guess the most likely piece, the organizers
embedded a non-trivial shortcut in the damaged G-code for
solving the challenge like a puzzle. They placed the design file
of the top half of the chess piece into a separate text file stored
on the cloud, giving view-only access to those with a link.
This link was embedded as a 3D QR code in the design of the
chess base given to the participants [15]. Unsurprisingly, some
participants approached the challenge without referencing to
5(a)
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Fig. 5. The participants received STL files of two designs (A and B in (a))
to find the correct orientation to slice and print that would remove surface
or internal defects. If printing without rotation, design A will be separated in
multiple segments like (b) and design B will have internal slots as shown in
(c). The correct orientations and supporting materials are shown in (d) and (e)
for design A and B, respectively, to obtain high quality parts without defects.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. HACK3D Challenge 3: Given (a) partial (maybe damaged) G-code
file, the attacker has to reconstruct the original G-code file that is cut off from
a chess piece from among the (b) three candidates.
the 3D QR code embedded in the base of the chess piece. The
red teams launched creative attacks. Some novel attacks are
highlighted below.
Attacks: One of the teams exploited the discrepancy in the
metadata in the G-code file. They noticed that the filament
length in the original piece (4290.7 mm) was different from
(a) (b)
Fig. 7. If one views the 3D QR code embedded in the chess base for HACK3D
Challenge 3 from a random direction, it looks like a group of spheres like (a).
However, viewed from the correct angle, it is a scannable QR code shown in
(b).
that shown by the G-code viewer (3198.14 mm). This gave
them insight into the cut off design and they concluded that
all pieces had a square cross-section. Next, using the provided
z-heights and the extracted height of the base piece from
the G-code, they determined where the chess piece was cut
off. They cropped the tops off of each chess piece and used
computer vision algorithms to measure the pixel dimensions.
They scaled the dimensions using information from the G-
code. They reconstructed the G-code for the top of all three
pieces. Since they knew the height difference between the
original and the damaged piece, they were able to deduce the
Queen as the target piece, as it matched closest in height. The
final result had an error of 1%.
A second red team processed the image and created a profile
of the edges of the different chess pieces. This produced a 1%
error in the geometry as the image processing led to a pixelated
line. Based on this chess piece edge information, one of the
teams created the shell of the Queen with the help of a few
reference points in the G-code and filled the top and bottom
layers with infill. The third team similarly processed the image.
However, they took a different approach and produced a square
prism at each point on the profile curve to recreate the pieces.
They inferred that the chess piece was the Queen based on the
filament length information in the damaged G-code.
Two of the teams were successful in recognizing the pres-
ence of a QR code embedded in the chess base. This embedded
QR code was segmented into small pieces and appeared like
a bundle of spheres as shown in Figure 7(a). Only when
viewed from a certain direction, the QR code could be seen
as Figure 7(b). One of the teams extracted this QR code from
the G-code. They then extracted the design file of the original
chess piece stored on the cloud server.
D. HACK3D Challenge 4
Challenge. This challenge targeted reverse engineering phase
in the AM supply chain along with file forensics. The red team
participants were given a physical print and a scaled-down
version of the STL file of a female connector (yellow parts
in Figure 8). The challenge entailed construction of a male
connector with appropriate design and dimensions compatible
with the female connector. Similar to Challenge 3, the design
6Fig. 8. HACK3D Challenge 4: The participants were given a female connector
(in yellow) and a scaled-down version of the STL file of the female connector.
They were required to use this information to reverse engineer the male part.
Three reconstructed designs are shown in the figure.
of the female connector had a 3D data matrix embedded within
its body. This data matrix, when viewed from the correct
orientation, had the password of an online server, while the
IP address and username were stored within the header of the
STL file. The challenge aimed to have the red team participants
wrangle with the structure of a typical STL file and understand
the challenge of viewing 2D codes converted to 3D. Once both
pieces of data were obtained, the participants would find the
design file of the male connector on the server.
Attacks. Under a tight time constraint of 6 hours, one red team
was able to extract the data matrix and get the password. They
studied the header of the STL file and accessed the correct
design file stored in the server. The male part was designed
with a snap fit and arms to prevent rotation (the left one in
Figure 8). Another red team took a geometric approach and
recreated a tight slide fit male part of the female part along
with the scale factor. While they were able to get the data
matrix, they could not recover the hidden message in the STL
file. Hence they were did not access the file stored on the
server. Their final design is the right most one in Figure 8.
Finally, one team manipulated the STL file and isolated a
single cross-section of triangles to create a profile of the
female part. After fine-tuning the profile, they created multiple
iterations3 of a snug fit to slide on the male connector (the
middle one in Figure 8).
E. Lessons Learned
The threat taxonomy in Figure 3 serves as a guide while de-
signing the HACK3D challenges. The challenge problems are
mapped to this taxonomy in Table II. Moreover, the attacking
approaches taken by the challenge participants are summarized
in Table III. The attackers may have explored other attack
vectors as well but the challenges only measured their success
in achieving the goals set by the problem. By analyzing and
summarizing the performance of the participating teams, the
following lessons were learned
1) More information can be extracted from leaked files
than what is anticipated. For example, in HACK3D
Challenge 3, one team looked into the metadata of
the corrupted G-code and extracted valuable information
(shown in Figure 9). For example, the first line in Figure 9
shows that the total filament length that will be used
for printing the whole chess design is 4290.7 mm. Par-
ticipants also used the image provided for visualization
3using brute force.
Fig. 9. Metadata of the corrupted G-code file in HACK3D Challenge 3.
Fig. 10. Two concentric circles in a CAD model and STL model.
for digital measurements. This demonstrates that more
information can be extracted if the files are obtained
by the adversaries. The metadata of files combined with
other information such as geometric structure of the
design, the measurement on actual physical prints, and
pictures of target designs can reveal more information
than anticipated and enables reverse engineering.
2) Common sense and CAD experiences can be used in
7TABLE II
SUMMARY OF HACK3D CHALLENGES ACCORDING TO THE TAXONOMY IN FIGURE 3.
What & Where How Why Effect Information Exploited
Challenge 1 XYZ Coordinates Steal Counterfeiting Monetary Loss Geometric Information
Challenge 2 STL file Steal Piracy Monetary Loss Geometric Information
Challenge 3 Partial G-code & An image Steal Piracy Monetary Loss Metadata of Files, Geometric Information
Challenge 4 STL file & A physical print of a female part Steal Counterfeiting Monetary Loss Metadata of Files, Measurement on Designs
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF ATTACK METHODS PROPOSED BY HACK3D TEAMS.
Information Exploited Skills Tools # of Teams
Attack 1-1 Geometric Information Reverse Engineering CAD Software & Self-developed Scripts 2
Attack 1-2 Geometric Information Reverse Engineering CAD Software 1
Attack 2-1 CAD Design Model CAD Commercial CAD Software 3
Attack 3-1 Metadata of G-code & Geometric Information Image Processing Self-developed Scripts 1
Attack 3-2 Metadata of G-code & Geometric Information Image Processing CAD Software & Self-developed Scripts 2
Attack 3-3 Hidden Code Embedded File Manipulation Self-developed Scripts 2
Attack 4-1 Physical Measurement & Hidden Code Embedded File Manipulation Self-developed Scripts 2
Attack 4-2 Hidden Code Embedded & Header of STL File Manipulation Self-developed Scripts 1
Attack 4-3 Physical Measurement & Geometric Information CAD Commercial CAD Software 2
reverse engineering attacks. In HACK3D challenge 1,
after one connects multiple adjacent coordinates to create
polygons, a doughnut-like shape, as shown in Figure 10,
can be observed. It is most likely that the shape is two
concentric circles in the CAD model. Although in the
digital file, there is no information to guarantee that
this shape is a circle, common sense and experiences in
designing CAD models can help the attackers realize the
functionality of the design and fine tune its shape.
Another example that shows common sense and past 3D
printing experiences is useful for attacking, happened in
HACK3D Challenge 2. Theoretically, there are around
50 million possible angle combinations, but an attacker
with rich printing experiences can quickly rule out many
combinations. For example, to print a high-quality prod-
uct, one would prefer to select the surface with a larger
area and mass towards the bottom of the printing toolpath.
This principle guides the attackers to choose the bottom
surface and prioritize rotations around the relevant axes.
3) Attackers need not necessarily be experts in AM
to launch a successful attack. In HACK3D Challenge
1, one team had no programming experience. So they
could not develop scripts to automate the generation of
the corresponding 3D model. However, they tried many
commercial CAD tools and found one add-on tool that
could provide an exact solution to the challenge. This
shows that the technical barrier to become an attacker is
indeed very low, and almost anyone can be an attacker in
an AM supply chain with little training. The capabilities
of CAD and other AM related tools will progressively
become better and can support complex designs and tasks.
This increasing sophistication will add to the attackers
tool box enabling, for example, reverse engineering.
4) Multi-disciplinary knowledge and skills are useful
both from an attacker and a defenders perspective.
Although one does not require a deep understanding of
cyber security to launch an attack on AM systems and
supply chains, more sophisticated and novel attacks can
be developed if one can combine knowledge and expertise
from different disciplines like computer science, elec-
trical engineering, mechanical engineering, and material
science. This is also why HACK3D challenges strongly
encourage participants who had different technical back-
grounds to join forces with each other and form cross-
disciplinary teams. The skills employed by the teams in
the attacks are listed in Table III. Image processing and
file manipulation are skills that computer science experts
always have, while 3D model reverse engineering and
CAD skills are a part of the training for mechanical
engineers. We are certain that the listed attack methods
are a partial list, and novel attack methods will emerge
as the security countermeasures become more and more
sophisticated. This also implies that to develop secure
defense mechanisms in AM supply chains, AM security
researchers need multi-disciplinary knowledge.
5) Attacks can originate in any stage in the AM supply
chain. The HACK3D challenges show that attackers can
launch attacks from almost any stage in the AM supply
chain, including STL files, G-code files, and physical
prints. AM security researchers should design and deploy
security measures to protect the whole AM supply chain.
A weakness in any stage can compromise the design
resulting in real-world consequences and monetary loss.
6) The taxonomy outlines numerous defenses and even
more number of attack pathways. Since we had only
two iterations of HACK3D, we explored a small set
of pathways through the taxonomy and several other
pathways remain to be explored.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Securing the additive manufacturing cyber-physical system
is a challenging task. A number of methods have been de-
veloped for embedding security features in the CAD designs,
8QR codes for identification of genuine products and cyber-
forensics of design and manufacturing files. We are conducting
an annual crowdsourcing approach to assess the strength of
some of the security methods yielding novel attacks. While
it is only in its formative years, HACK3D showed that red-
teams with a range of skills –with minimal knowledge in
AM and Cyber security to expert interdisciplinary knowledge–
developed innovative attacks in defeating the embedded secu-
rity. The defenses and the attacks can be used to benchmark
both future defenses and attacks for the AM community. The
approaches documented by HACK3D will provide an insight
into developing next generation security methods and applying
them to manufacturing processes. Consistently, we noticed
that the participants were able to obtain more information
from the files than was anticipated and this informed effective
attacks. Despite a stringent timeline for solving the challenges,
several red teams made significant advancements and many of
them solved the challenges. It is clear that multi-disciplinary
training is important for the emerging AM workforce to
develop security methods for AM CPS. Otherwise they may
not anticipate many of the impending attack vectors.
From our 20/20 hindsight of organizing CSAW CTF and
CSAW embedded security challenges [16], we are optimistic
that the HACK3D attacks and defenses will become the basis
for an open, community-accessible benchmark resource that
the AM community can use, add onto, and improve AM
cybersecurity.
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